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Is the U.S. Helping Israel—or Emboldening It To Take Big Risks? | Opinion

On October 1, Israel dodged a bullet—or, more accurately, a barrage of 180 ballistic missiles. Iran’s strike, meant to avenge Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and a senior Iranian general days earlier, did little damage to Israel’s military infrastructure. For the most part, Israel’s air defense system, aided by U.S. Navy ships based in the Eastern Mediterranean, neutralized the missiles before they landed.
A few dozen, however, did break through Israel’s anti-missile network. Satellite images taken the day after the Iranian attack showed multiple impact points at the Nevatim Airbase, deep in the Negev Desert. U.S. defense officials likely had some of those images in mind over the weekend when they announced the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, along with a 100-strong U.S. crew, to buttress Israel’s defenses.
The THAAD is a highly sophisticated air defense platform that can intercept medium- and intermediate-range missiles, above and beyond what the trademark U.S. Patriot system can do. There are only nine THAAD batteries available at any one time, so the fact that one was so rapidly moved to Israel demonstrates just how concerned the Biden administration is about hostilities with Iran flaring up in the days and weeks to come.
On one level, sending one of the most effective U.S. air defense weapons to a partner during a time of need makes sense. Nobody wants to see Israeli civilians die. The Israeli government could obviously use the help; Hezbollah continues to launch drones and missiles into the country—four Israeli troops were killed in a Hezbollah drone attack over the weekend—and even Hamas still has a few rudimentary rockets at its disposal. Depending on how Iran responds to the Israeli counterattack the region assumes is inevitable, Israel could potentially be stretched thin trying to defend hundreds of targets, civilian and military, simultaneously. Militarily speaking, a THAAD system will offset some of the load. The deployment itself is also in keeping with the Biden administration’s policy to date, which at various times leaned into surging U.S. military assets to the immediate region to deter wider escalation and, if all else fails, add another layer of protection for Israel.
But nobody should be under the illusion that this is a risk-free decision.
While dispatching 100 U.S. troops in Israel may not seem significant in the grand scheme of things—there are already about 43,000 U.S. troops operating in the Middle East, after all—we need to remember that Israel is fighting a war on seven different fronts. By ordering U.S. forces into Israel, the Biden administration has arguably made the U.S. military into a possible co-belligerent if or when the Iranian missiles start flying. Yes, U.S. fighter aircraft and warships have already engaged those missiles twice before, during the April and October exchanges. But conducting air defense from stand-off positions is safer than doing it on the ground, where a misstep could result in casualties. Although those in the commentariat might roll their eyes and call this concern extremely pessimistic, policymakers don’t have the luxury of planning for the best. Mistakes happen, and no system is entirely foolproof.
Is President Joe Biden prepared to enter into direct conflict with Iran if an Iranian missile kills an American soldier? To date, the White House has been adamant that it doesn’t want further escalation in the Middle East, let alone a war with the Iranians. This is for good reason—while nobody assumes Washington would lose such a war, the event itself would likely still be a long slog, add huge turbulence to the oil markets and envelop the entire region. U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan would all be at risk of getting drawn in. Some of them, particularly those in Iraq and Syria, are already exposed to Iranian-backed proxy groups.
There’s another risk as well: What message does the THAAD deployment send to the Israeli government? The Biden administration hopes the move will illustrate that America has its back. Fair enough. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could very well take away an altogether different message: I can do pretty much anything in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran and the world’s most capable superpower will support me unconditionally.
This implicit message isn’t as outlandish as it may seem. There have been multiple cases over the past year of the U.S. seeking to achieve one objective, only for Netanyahu to undermine it into oblivion. Biden warned Israel that an invasion of Rafah would cross the administration’s red line; Netanyahu did it anyway. Biden claimed that Israel endorsed his three-phase ceasefire plan in Gaza; Netanyahu instead added more conditions to it. Biden tried to move Gaza ceasefire talks to their conclusion during the summer, only for Netanyahu to order the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, the group’s main negotiator. Washington hustled to get a temporary ceasefire in the Israeli-Lebanese border area and thought it had Israel’s blessing, only for Netanyahu to reject it.
The THAAD is designed to defend Israel. It might have the counterproductive effect of emboldening it instead.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.

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